Geonarcotics of the Contemporary Caribbean:
Content, Consequences, Countermeasures

Dr. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith
Professor of Political Science
Provost & Senior Vice President
York College
The City University of New York

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INTRODUCTION

Thanks for invitation, introduction

Will offer Geonarcotics assessment in relation to questions related to three C’s:

What are the core Content aspects of the drugs challenge?

What are some security Consequences of those aspects impacting the Caribbean?

What are some Countermeasures being employed by Caribbean & other stakeholders?

Likely will have time for only first 2 questions

Geonarcotics

Concept, originated early 1990s, posits that:

1. drugs, geography, power, and politics interact dynamically;
2. the drugs phenomenon is multidimensional, with four main problem areas: production, consumption-abuse, trafficking, and money laundering;
3. these problem areas give rise to actual and potential threats to security of states; and
4. drug operations & activities they spawn precipitate conflict & coop among state & non-state actors.

Geonarcotics approach: “war on drugs” not purely military matter; security more than military defense
First Question

What are the core **Content** aspects of the drugs challenge?

**Security Dimensions & Threats**
- **Military**
  - Arms trafficking
  - Militarization
  - Narcoterrorism
- **Political**
  - Violence
  - Corruption
  - Vigilantism
- **Economic**
  - Resource Depletion
  - Productivity Loss
  - Inflation
  - Resource Realloc’n
- **Environmental**
  - Pollution
  - Deforestation
  - Species Destruction
  - Disease

**Countermeasures**
- **National**
  - Education
  - Law Enforcem’t
  - Interdiction
  - Legislation
  - Rehabilitation
  - Crop Subst’ retro
  - Confiscation
  - Prevention
  - Econ. Dev.
  - Eradication
- **International**
  - Interdiction
  - Intelligence
  - Education
  - Legal Assistance
  - Research
  - Extradition
  - Chemical Control
  - Dev. Assistance

**Actors**
- **National**
  - Individuals
  - NGOs
  - Vigilante Groups
  - Narcos
  - Guerrillas
  - Corporations
- **International**
  - States
  - Narco Cartels
  - IGOs
  - MNCs
  - INGOs
Content Dynamics

1. Eight general observations about contemporary scenario:
   1. Despite valiant efforts & considerable funding by CB and other stakeholders, regional situation not improving appreciably and consistently; both “gains” and “losses.”
   2. Compared to decade ago, there’s increased drug production in GUY, BAR, St. Vincent & Grenadines, and other places; lessening of consumption in many places, but increases in Cuba, DR, parts of ECB, Puerto Rico.
   3. Active anti-ML efforts in many places & none in others despite legislation & work of CB Fin. Action Task Force.
   4. Major trafficking successes in BAH, JAM, ECB, and other places, but increased trafficking in GUY, DR, Eastern and Southern CB, partly as a balloon effect of Mérida Initiative.

More Dynamics

5. Guns & Gangs have combined to present troubling new norms, creating fear in urban and rural communities.
6. State security deficits (SSD) have led to growth of private security industry (PSI). There’s PSI regulation in some countries. In some, combined size & assets of PSI rival—in others, exceed—state security forces & assets.
7. Over past decade power by drug lords & other criminals & security deficits in some states have increased their vulnerability. Some, including JAM, BAH, SLU, GUY, TNT were pushed to edge of governance precipice.
8. Despite some media reports & gravity of the situation recently in JAM, PR, GUY, DR, SUR, and TNT, I do not consider any Caribbean nation to be a narco-state
Second Question

What are some security Consequences of those aspects impacting the region?

Murder by Numbers

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<th>Country</th>
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<th>2007 N</th>
<th>% Change</th>
<th>2008 N</th>
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Sources: Figures for Puerto Rico are from [http://www.trendsweb.com/Violencia/Violencia.htm](http://www.trendsweb.com/Violencia/Violencia.htm); others are from the OAS Department of Public Security, available at [http://www.unc.org/dep/observatorio/hemispheric/countries.aspx/Threats-en](http://www.unc.org/dep/observatorio/hemispheric/countries.aspx/Threats-en), except that the figures for 2010 for Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Suriname are from the offices of the Commissioners of Police for the respective countries.
"The security situation in the Caribbean has changed. In several countries, the rate of violent crime has escalated and has become high relative to rates in other regions of the world. The region has become more violent. This is the main challenge facing Caribbean countries. The rate, level of intensity, and primary form of violence, however, vary from country to country. In those countries with the highest rates of violence, organized crime and gang violence present the greatest challenge. In others, gender-based violence is the main concern. …

"… The increase in violent crimes has been accompanied by a decrease in crime clearance and conviction rates. In some countries, the rapid rise in rates of violent crime has been accompanied by a similarly precipitous decline in arrest and conviction rates to low levels. Inequality and social exclusion are big contributors to the high rates of violence, but the near immunity to arrest also partly accounts for the high rates of violent crime in some countries." Caribbean Human Development Report 2012, 41.
Illegal Arms Trafficking

- Weapons from US to & through region
- Trade within region—notably involving Haiti, Puerto Rico, Dom Rep, Jamaica
- Flow from South America
- Many signed 1997 OAS treaty; some—including US—still to ratify, implement
- Ratification pledged at 5th Summit …
- US offers aid, has eTrace agreements
- Other bilateral agreements
- OAS anti arms smuggling agreements

Other Major Consequences

- Police, army, other state corruption & impunity
- Overcrowded & unhealthy prisons.
- “Grown men and women held in cells… without sanitary facilities, forced to defecate in the presence of fellow prisoners in buckets, in plastic bags and on paper to be poured into plastic buckets…And we talk about human rights. … In the evening, they must stuff their ears and their nostrils, they must put bread in a corner to deflect the cockroaches from crawling into their unguarded orifices.” – Senator [now Minister] Verna St Rose-Greaves, Trinidad and Tobago, March 26, 2010
Third Question

What are some Countermeasures being employed by Caribbean, other stakeholders?

Context is Key

Two key contexts:

1. Nature of drugs challenge: defined by
   A. Transnationality
   B. Multidimensionality
2. Nature of Caribbean: defined by
   A. States that are small, with severe resource constraints
   B. States with security challenges other than those related to drugs—economic & environmental ones for all, plus border and territorial disputes for some.

Thus, countermeasures must be sustained, simultaneous, multilateral, and multidimensional: individual; bilateral; sub-regional; regional; hemispheric; and international systemic
“I remember too that in Jamaica the mongoose was imported from India to kill out the snakes. It did a very good job. The snakes were eliminated. The mongoose then turned its attention to the chickens. There is a lesson in all this. Effective measures against vermin may be turned to effective use by the ill-intentioned against decent and law abiding citizens.”
~ Carl Rattray, then Jamaica’s Minister of Justice & Attorney General, May 1991; died March 2012
Thank You for Your Attention