DRAFT FINAL REPORT

GROUP OF EXPERTS ON
MARITIME NARCOTRAFFICKING
DRAFT FINAL REPORT

Preliminary Version
Executive Summary

During its thirty-fifth regular session in Washington (April 27-30, 2004), the Commission directed the Group of Experts on Maritime Narcotrafficking to meet and begin work on the recommendations contained in Hemispheric Study on Maritime Narcotrafficking. The Group of Experts was directed to consider a number of priority recommendations that the Commission identified and prioritize the remaining ones.

The Group of Experts met in Tegucigalpa, Honduras from June 21 to 25, 2004. Juan Pablo Rodriguez Rodriguez, Capitain de Navio D.E.M.N., of the Honduran Navy served as chairman of the Group of Experts. Twenty-six experts from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, United States and Venezuela participated in this meeting. Also present was an observer from the Government of France.

The Group considered all of the recommendations directed to the Group and prioritized them. In addition, the Group began working on a number of priority recommendations identified by the Commission.

The Group of Experts offers the following priority recommendations for the Commission’s consideration:

1. That the Commission:
   - accept the draft prioritisation of recommendations (Annex III of this report) contained in the Hemispheric Study of Maritime Narcotrafficking and direct the Group of Experts to proceed with the plan of action defined in Annex IV of this report.
   - accept the following reference tools and direct the Executive Secretariat to post them on the CICAD web page and distribute copies to the CICAD Commissioners to share with the appropriate entities or agencies in each member state:
     - the Threat /Risk Assessment Matrix for Port Security and
     - the reference guide or matrix for the exchange of information
     - the Model Operating Procedures Guide for Combined Maritime Counter Drug Operations

2. That the Commission direct the Expert Group on Maritime Narcotrafficking to meet, complete the following tasks and report to the Commission during its XXXVIII regular session during the fall of 2005:
   - proceed to implement the plan of action (Annex IV of this report) regarding the remaining recommendations
• **prepare**, with coordination by Canada, threat/risk assessment matrices for the coastal areas and maritime approaches to be finalized at the next meeting of the group, proposed for 2005 (subject to approval by the Commission and at a date to be determined)

• **reconsider** recommendation #4

  Examine and evaluate current data collection systems used in ports and prepare a reference guide for use of member states in developing or upgrading their national systems

In doing so, the Group will be able to benefit from the experience gained through the implementation of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which should affect information gathering and exchange.

• **use** the Model Operating Procedures Guide for Combined Maritime Counter Drug Operations as an outline and, with coordination by Trinidad and Tobago, create a more detailed and comprehensive manual to be finalized at the next meeting of the Group proposed for 2005.

3. That the Commission direct the Executive Secretariat to:

• **compile** information concerning national laws, agreements for cooperation (bilateral, multi-national and regional) and operational points of contact in member states related to the port security and the control of maritime narcotrafficking and post this information on the CICAD web page.
I. BACKGROUND

During its thirty-fourth regular session held in Montreal, Canada, November 17-20, 2003, the Commission considered the Hemispheric Study on Maritime Narcotrafficking and the report of the Working Group that prepared it. In doing so, the Commission accepted the recommendations contained in the report, including one to establish a Group of Experts on this issue. The Commission directed that the Group meet during 2004 to act on the recommendations in the aforementioned report and possibly identify new issues related to the control of maritime narcotrafficking.

Further to an offer by the delegation of Honduras to chair and host the meeting, the Group of Expert on Maritime Narcotrafficking subsequently met from June 21 to 25, 2004 in Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

II. PROCEEDINGS

A. PARTICIPANTS

1. MEMBER STATES OF CICAD

Twenty-six experts from the following member states participated in this meeting: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, United States and Venezuela. Also present was an observer from France. (List of Participants attached in Annex I).

B. SESSIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE MEETING

1. OPENING SESSION

The opening session for this Group of Experts meeting took place at 9:30 on June 21 at the Tegucigalpa Marriott. Welcoming remarks were offered by Lic. Armida de López Contreras, Designada Presidencial and President of the National Council Against Narcotraficking of Honduras and by Mr. Ziggie Malyniwsy, Chief of the Supply Reduction and Control Section, OAS/CICAD.
2. WORKING SESSIONS

The Group of Experts on Maritime Narcotrafficking met in plenary session and in smaller working groups to consider the priority recommendations coming from the hemispheric study and October 2003 report of the working Group. Juan Pablo Rodriguez Rodríguez, Capitain de Navio D.E.M.N., of the Honduran Navy served as chairman of the Group of Experts. The Group considered all of the recommendations directed to the Group and prioritized them. In addition, the Group began working on a number of priority recommendations identified by the Commission. A copy of the schedule of activities is attached (Annex II).

In conducting its work, the Group was mindful of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and the July 1, 2004 target date for its implementation.

According to the IMO, the purpose of the Code is “to provide a standardized, consistent framework for evaluating risk, enabling Governments to offset changes in threat with changes in vulnerability for ships and port facilities through determination of appropriate security levels and corresponding security measures”.

In summary the ISPS Code:
- enables the detection and deterrence of security threats within an international framework
- establishes roles and responsibilities
- enables collection and exchange of security information
- provides a methodology for assessing security
- ensures that adequate security measures are in place.

It requires ship and port facility staff to:
- gather and assess information
- maintain communication protocols
- restrict improper access; prevent the introduction of unauthorized weapons, etc.
- provide the means to raise alarms
- put in place vessel and port security plans; and ensure training and drills are conducted.

Before proceeding with the assigned tasks, Brigadier General (r) Julián Arístides González Irías, Director of the Fight Against Drug Trafficking in Honduras delivered a presentation on the current situation in Honduras as it relates to maritime narcotrafficking. In his presentation, Admiral González described the circumstances in Honduras that make it vulnerable to being used in the movement of illicit drugs and the challenges that Honduras is facing in responding to this situation. Most of the observations and comments made by the Admiral are consistent with the findings of the Hemispheric Study on Maritime Narcotrafficking conducted in 2003.
A. Review and prioritization of Study recommendations

The October 2003 report on the Hemispheric Study of Maritime Narcotrafficking contained a series of recommendations directed to the member states (8 recommendations), the Executive Secretariat (9 recommendations) and to the Group of Experts (13 recommendations). The Recommendations are noted in Annex III, attached). The Commission instructed the Group to initiate action on the priority recommendations numbered 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7. The Group of Experts was also to consider and prioritize the remaining recommendations for action.

For this second prioritization exercise, the Group of Experts used the following simple time scale:

**Short term** – a priority issue for which action would be initiated during this meeting of the Group of Experts, with the final product or plan of action for completion to be presented during the Commission’s thirty-sixth regular session in the fall of 2004.

**Medium term** – an issue for which action would be initiated between this meeting and the next meeting of the Group proposed to take place in 2005. Preliminary work would be conducted during the interim between meetings and the Group would consider and final draft products at the meeting in 2005.

**Longer term** – issues that the Group would revisit during the proposed meeting in 2005. At that time the Group would reconsider the need to proceed with the initiative(s) in question and, as appropriate, define a plan of action for execution.

The Group considered the recommendations and assigned a level of priority to each. The five short-term priority recommendations identified by the Commission for which the Group is to begin work now are considered separately in greater detail below in this report. Details of the priorities assigned to the remaining recommendations and the proposed course of action are presented in a matrix found in Annex IV.

The matrix defines a work plan for the group to deal with the remaining recommendations. The group recommends that the Commission accept this plan and direct the group to proceed with implementation.

The Group of Experts:
- **recommends** that the Commission accept the matrix with the prioritization and work plan for action concerning the remaining recommendations and direct the Group of Experts to proceed with its implementation
B. Review of priority recommendations (#’s 1, 2, 4, 5, 7):

The Experts divided into 4 sub-groups to consider the priority recommendations. The delegation of Honduras had prepared some preliminary drafts or documents that could serve as a point of departure for discussion each of the priority recommendations. Several other delegations did the same or brought examples of what they have in place in their respective country.

Each sub-group was asked to examine the recommendation for which it had responsibility. In doing so, each sub-group was asked to prepare a draft product and/or develop a plan of action to finalize the recommendation. The sub-groups would then present their work to the plenary for further discussion and modification.

Recommendation #1:

Create a standardized threat/risk assessment matrix for countries to use in evaluating vulnerabilities and gaps in port security, coastal areas, and maritime approaches.

The delegation of Canada coordinated the work of the first sub-group that considered recommendation #1. The sub-group included representatives from Canada, Chile, Haiti, Jamaica and Venezuela.

The proposed risk assessment methodology provides a consistent and systematic approach to determining the relative security risks. It is built around four core elements:

- Identifying possible scenarios
- Assessing the likelihood of the scenarios
- Identifying and assessing vulnerabilities
- Assessing the potential impacts

Assessing relative risk is based upon an analytical assessment of threat, vulnerability and impact using a scoring system. Scenarios based on “reasonable worst cases” serve as proxies to measure the relative risk associated with the selected deficiency. The threat assessment is the first step to estimate the probability of a particular scenario-taking place. The threat assessment is based upon:

- An intelligence evaluation
- History of similar incidents, including frequency, location and targets
- Feasibility of the scenario (Probability and Detection)

**Vulnerability** is an indication of the degree of risk from the scenario in question. It consists of the following factors:

- Existing security measures
- Location
- Control effectiveness (Personnel and Means of Control)
The impact assessment estimates the consequences in the scenario. It considers human loss (or potential for loss) and economic consequence.

The recommendation called for a matrix that considered port security, coastal areas, and maritime approaches. This covers a broad range of diverse issues. As such, the group focused on the port security component. This is particularly appropriate given priority attention countries have been giving to meeting the July 1, 2004 implementation date for the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. The matrix takes into consideration the requirements set forth in the ISPS Code.

The threat matrix package (Annex V) focuses on ports and includes the following:

- a Drug Threat / Risk Assessment Checklist
- a Port Threat / Assessment Matrix
- Scoring Definitions and Explanations

Using the Drug Threat / Risk Assessment Checklist, port authorities or other entities concerned with port security can review the situation in a given port and identify gaps or potential problems. For each gap identified they can then use the Matrix to assess the threat level presented by the gaps in question, the vulnerability faced by the port and the potential impact of these gaps. The assessment uses a numeric score for each of the elements in the matrix, which are described in the Score Definitions and Explanations table. The resultant score provides an indication as to where corrective action is required and, where the levels of threat and risk warrant it, where corrective action should be taken.

The Group of Experts:
- offers the Threat Assessment Matrix for Port Security for the Commission’s consideration
- recommends that the Commission accept the matrix and to direct the Executive Secretariat to post the matrix on the CICAD web page and distribute it to the member states to be shared with the appropriate agencies, authorities or departments.
- recommends that the Commission direct the Group of Experts to meet and with coordination by Canada, prepare similar matrices for the coastal areas, and maritime approaches.

Recommendation #2:

Create a Model Maritime Control Legislation (or a set of laws and regulations) that countries can use to review and update their laws and regulations to ensure adequate maritime jurisdiction and security.
In considering this recommendation, the Group of Experts reaffirmed that national laws for the control of maritime narcotrafficking form the framework for any meaningful control efforts in this area. Establishing such legislation can be a complex undertaking. The issue of maritime narcotrafficking covers a range of individual and diverse elements such as ports, coastal waters etc. and involves various different agencies and, in some instances, the private sector. This presents a significant challenge for those drafting appropriate legislation. Such legislation may also have to give consideration to both national and international issues. It is possible that the complexity of the resultant legislation required may make it necessary to rely on a series of individual but statutes that ideally are linked.

Initiatives such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code prepared by the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO), serve as a model or standard for national legislation and operations. The Code deals with one specific element in the range of maritime control issues.

Based on a very full discussion by the plenary of the Group of Experts, a sub-group, coordinated by Honduras, with representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, Mexico and the United States, was asked to give this recommendation further consideration.

The Group of Experts agreed that the development of model maritime control legislation would be an extremely complex task. It would require specialized expertise in maritime law and operational issues related to the control of maritime narcotrafficking. As a point of departure, the Group of Experts proposed that the Executive Secretariat prepare a compilation of national laws on the control of maritime narcotrafficking. This information or links to where it can be found could then be posted to the CICAD web page. This compilation would be a tool placed at the disposal of all countries interested in knowing about, adopting, or amending maritime drug trafficking laws. Information on other related topics such as a Directory of National Operational Points of Contact Points to facilitate international cooperation and information exchange could also be included.

The Executive Secretariat could consult with member states and draw on existing sources such as the Hemispheric Study on Maritime Narcotrafficking to compile information for the following general sections:

I. International Conventions and Standards
II. Regional Agreements
III. Bilateral Agreements
IV. Domestic Legislation
V. Directory of National Contact Points
The Commission may call on the Group of Experts to prepare model legislation at a later date if member states find that the reference tool proposed above does not meet their needs. Membership in the Group would, however, need to be very specialized with experts in maritime law and maritime counterdrug operational activities.

The Group of Experts:
- **recommends** that the Commission direct the Executive Secretariat to compile information on bilateral and regional agreements, national laws and others issues related to the control of maritime narcotrafficking and post this information to the CICAD’s web page.

**Recommendations #4:**

Examine and evaluate current data collection systems used in ports and prepare a reference guide for use of member states in developing or upgrading their national systems.

**Recommendations #5:**

Develop a reference guide of best practices regarding the methods for the exchange of counterdrug intelligence and information applied to port security programs.

**Recommendations #8:**

Develop a mechanism for agencies in member states to share information with counterparts in other countries regarding concealment methods, trends, routes and general event information related to port security and the control of maritime narcotrafficking.

The Commission identified recommendations #4 and #5 as priority issues for consideration by the Group at this meeting. Both of these recommendations are concerned with the issue of information gathering or exchange. Recommendation #8 is also concerned with this same issue. For this reason, the Group proposed to consider the three recommendations together.

Recommendation #4 is concerned with data collection within a port. The ISPS Code also deals with this issue among others. As mentioned above, the target for the implementation of the Code was July 1, 2004. The Code includes aspects related to information gathering and exchange. Under the circumstances, the Group proposed to set aside further action on Recommendation #4 pending implementation of the ISPS Code. The Group of Experts proposes to consider this recommendation at its next
meeting in 2005. In doing so, the Group would be in a better position to assess data gathering processes and potential best practices further to ISPS Code implementation.

The delegation of Mexico coordinated the work of the sub-group that considered recommendations #5 and #8. The sub-group included representatives from Brazil, Canada, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras and Mexico. Recommendations #5 and #8 are concerned with data gathering and exchange and sharing information on current trends related to smuggling methods, routes and other aspects of maritime narcotrafficking.

In considering these two recommendations, the sub-group recognized that there are important differences between “information” and “intelligence”. In many instances, there are restrictions in place defined by national legislation that define when, how and with whom intelligence can be shared. This frequently limits the ability of agencies or ministries to share intelligence with counterparts in other countries. Similarly, the sub-group recognized that there are different types of information including strategic, tactical and operational. All of these factors must be considered when speaking of gathering, exchanging or sharing information and/or intelligence.

As a starting point, the sub-group examined information exchange at its most basic, bilateral level. At this level the problems begin with knowing the names and contact information for operational counterparts in other countries. This is particularly true in relation to requests made further to Article 17 of the 1988 Convention. The Group recommended that if the Executive Secretariat has not already done so, it should compile information concerning operational points of contact in member states for matters related to the port security and the control of maritime narcotrafficking and post this information on the CICAD web page.

A second issue is concerned with what information is required and then establishing a means to facilitate the exchange of this information on a regular basis. This exchange could be as part of an on-going investigation or following the conclusion of an operation. It could be on a bilateral or multilateral level. To facilitate this exchange, the Group developed a reference guide or matrix for the exchange of information (copy attached in Annex VI). This matrix provides a format for the exchange of information that can be modified in response to the individual needs of the agencies or countries that may use it. The group recommends that the matrix for information exchange be included in the CICAD web page.

At a more strategic level, the sub-group made note of the fact that there currently exist a variety of automated systems for the exchange of information. Organizations such as Interpol, the World Customs Organization (WCO), and U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operate such systems. Many of these systems are linked to databases and provide the users with varying degrees of access to the information. The systems have different mechanisms to share information contained in these systems or databases. In some instances, users are able to search the system, in others those responsible for maintaining the system provide regular reports on trends.
Agencies in many of CICAD’s member states participate in one or more automated information systems operated by the functional organizations such as those listed above. The Group of Experts encourages member states to approach the coordinators of these systems and propose they include the agencies, departments etc involved the control of maritime narcotrafficking in their country.

The Group of Experts made particular note of the existence of a hemispheric drug information system established by the US DEA. It includes participants in this system are linked to sub-regional centers in Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic. Participating agencies are able to report information through these centers that is then validated, classified, processed and disseminated back through the network. In this way, the information cycle is completed and all participants benefit from this collective information gathering process, strengthening their joint efforts to combat drug trafficking. Annex VII contains a brief overview of this system.

The Group of Experts encourages member states to make maximum use of existing information systems and the provisions for information exchange found in bilateral, multi-national and regional agreements related to the control of drug trafficking or maritime narcotrafficking.

The Group of Experts:
- recommends that the Commission direct the Executive Secretariat to compile information concerning operational points of contact in member states for matters related to the port security and the control of maritime narcotrafficking and post this information on the CICAD web page.
- offers the matrix for the exchange of information for the Commission’s consideration
- recommends that the Commission accept the matrix and to direct the Executive Secretariat to post it on the CICAD web page.

Recommendation #7:

Develop Model Operating Procedures Manual for joint and combined bilateral or regional interdiction operations, for those member states whose laws and regulations allow them to conduct such operations, taking into account the jurisdictional limits and national legal systems of the parties involved when creating the bilateral or regional agreement or arrangements for such operations.

The delegation of Honduras coordinated the work of the sub-group that considered recommendation #7. The sub-group included representatives from Canada, Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.
The sub-group focused its attention on the issue of a Model Operating Procedures Manual for joint and combined bilateral or regional interdiction operations. In doing so, the sub-group recognized that such standard operating procedures are usually set in place further to some sort of bilateral, multinational or regional agreement for cooperation. These agreements define the provisions, scope and parameters of these operating procedures. Although there is in this case no underlying treaty agreement, the sub-group believed that it would be possible to develop a model that could serve as a point of departure for developing operating procedures. The model would include those elements that countries should consider including in their standard operating procedures further to bilateral or multinational agreements concerned with the control of maritime narcotrafficking.

The group recommends that the Commission accept the Model Operating Procedures Guide for Combined Maritime Counter Drug Operations (copy attached in Annex VIII) and direct the Executive Secretariat to post it to the CICAD web page and distribute copies to appropriate national entities in member states. The group also recommends that it continue its work in this area and, using the current guide as an outline, create a more detailed and comprehensive manual. The delegation of Trinidad and Tobago will coordinate this effort and using electronic means to work with other members of the sub-group, will present a draft to be considered and finalized by the group during its next proposed meeting in 2005.

3. CLOSING SESSION

The Group of Experts concluded its work at 2:00 on June 25. The Chair of the Group closed the meeting and thanked the members for their participation.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CICAD IN ITS THIRTY-SIXTH REGULAR SESSION:

1. That the Commission:

   • **accept** the draft prioritisation of recommendations (Annex III of this report) contained in the Hemispheric Study of Maritime Narcotrafficking and direct the Group of Experts to proceed with the plan of action defined in Annex IV of this report.
   
   • **accept** the following reference tools and direct the Executive Secretariat to post them on the CICAD web page and distribute copies to the CICAD Commissioners to share with the appropriate entities or agencies in each member state:
     
     - the Threat /Risk Assessment Matrix for Port Security and
     - the reference guide or matrix for the exchange of information
     - the Model Operating Procedures Guide for Combined Maritime Counter Drug Operations

2. That the Commission direct the Expert Group on Maritime Narcotrafficking to meet, complete the following tasks and report to the Commission during its XXXVIII regular session during the fall of 2005:

   • **proceed** to implement the plan of action (Annex IV of this report) regarding the remaining recommendations
   
   • **prepare**, with coordination by Canada, threat/risk assessment matrices for the coastal areas and maritime approaches to be finalized at the next meeting of the group, proposed for 2005 (subject to approval by the Commission and at a date to be determined)
   
   • **reconsider** recommendation #4

   Examine and evaluate current data collection systems used in ports and prepare a reference guide for use of member states in developing or upgrading their national systems

   In doing so, the Group will be able to benefit from the experience gained through the implementation of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which should affect information gathering and exchange.

   • **use** the **Model Operating Procedures Guide for Combined Maritime Counter Drug Operations** as an outline and, with coordination by
Trinidad and Tobago, create a more detailed and comprehensive manual to be finalized at the next meeting of the Group proposed for 2005.

3. That the Commission direct the Executive Secretariat to:

- **compile** information concerning national laws, agreements for cooperation (bilateral, multi-national and regional) and operational points of contact in member states related to the port security and the control of maritime narcotrafficking and post this information on the CICAD web page.
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<td>Agregaduría Militar de Chile</td>
<td>Cnel. Patricio Rojas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Jefe Departamento de Fiscalización de Drogas</td>
<td>Servicio Nacional Aduanas</td>
<td>José Luis Castro</td>
<td>jl <a href="mailto:Castro@aduana.cl">Castro@aduana.cl</a></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estados Unidos</td>
<td>Program Officer</td>
<td>Dept. de Estado U.S.A. Buro Internacional de Narcoticos</td>
<td>Mario Fernandez</td>
<td>202-647-8984</td>
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<td>México</td>
<td>Director de Cooperación Internacional</td>
<td>Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores</td>
<td>Guillermo A. Hernández Salmerón</td>
<td>5062-3030</td>
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<td><a href="mailto:ghsalmeron@sre.gob.mx">ghsalmeron@sre.gob.mx</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>México</td>
<td>Sub Jefe S-2 EMGA</td>
<td>Secretaría de Marina Armada de México</td>
<td>Jose L. Arellano Ruiz</td>
<td>5624-6280 / Fax. 56770453</td>
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<td><a href="mailto:capitan5710@aol.com">capitan5710@aol.com</a></td>
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<td><a href="mailto:jarellano57@hotmail.com">jarellano57@hotmail.com</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Countries / Países: 14</td>
<td>Participants / Participantes: 28</td>
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MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON MARITIME NARCOTRAFFICKING
June 21-25, 2004

SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES

Monday, June 21

08:30 – 09:00 Registration

09:00 – 09:30 Opening Remarks

09:30 – 10:00 Introduction and Review
  • Background
  • Hemispheric Study of Maritime Narcotrafficking
  • Objectives and CICAD Commission expectations
  • Schedule of work
  • Proposed work methodology

10:00 – 10:45 Review of tasks assigned
  • Review and prioritize recommendations into short, medium and long term
  • Prepare plan of action

10:45 – 11:00 Break

11:00 – 12:30 Plan of action (cont.)

12:30 – 14:00 Lunch

Review of Priority Recommendations

14:00 – 14:45 General plenary discussion of Priority Recommendations

14:45 – 15:30 Review of Priority Recommendations by individual sub-groups
15:30 – 15:45  Break

15:45 – 17:30  Review of Priority Recommendations by individual sub-groups (cont.)

Tuesday, June 22

09:00 – 10:45  Review of Priority Recommendations by individual sub-groups (cont.)

10:45 – 11:00  Break

11:00 – 12:30  Review of Priority Recommendations by individual sub-groups (cont.)

12:30 – 14:00  Lunch

14:00 – 15:45  Review of Priority Recommendations by individual sub-groups (cont.)

15:45 – 16:00  Break

16:00 – 17:30  Review of Priority Recommendations by individual sub-groups (cont.)

Wednesday, June 23

09:00 – 10:45  Review of Priority Recommendations by individual sub-groups (cont.)

10:45 – 11:00  Break

11:00 – 12:30  Review of Priority Recommendations by individual sub-groups (cont.)

12:30 – 14:00  Lunch

14:00 – 15:45  Review of Priority Recommendations by individual sub-groups (cont.)
15:45 – 16:00  Break
16:00 – 17:30  Presentation(s) by sub-group(s)

Thursday, June 24

09:00 – 10:45  Review of Priority Recommendations by individual sub-groups (cont.)
10:45 – 11:00  Break
11:00 – 12:30  Review of Priority Recommendations by individual sub-groups (cont.)
12:30 – 14:00  Lunch
14:00 – 15:45  Presentation(s) by sub-group(s)
15:45 – 16:00  Break
16:00 – 17:30  Presentation(s) by sub-group(s)

Friday, June 25

09:00 – 10:45  Identification of potential issues of concern and priorities regarding port security, maritime cooperation and other matters related to the control of maritime narcotrafficking for consideration by the Working Group
10:45 – 11:00  Break
11:00 – 12:30  Conclusions, commitments and recommendations for action by the Working Group
12:30 – 14:00  Lunch
14:00 – 15:45  Plan of Action
15:45 – 16:00  Break
16:00 – 17:00  Plan of Action
17:00 –  Closing
Annex III

Recommend the creation of an Expert Group on Maritime Control Issues to undertake the following tasks:

1. Create a standardized threat/risk assessment matrix for countries to use in evaluating vulnerabilities and gaps in port security, coastal areas, and maritime approaches.

2. Create a Model Maritime Control Legislation (or a set of laws and regulations) that countries can use to review and update their laws and regulations to ensure adequate maritime jurisdiction and security.

3. Develop best practices and related strategies that member states could implement to promote effective controls over ports and maritime narcotrafficking in an environment of limited resources (human, financial and equipment).

4. Examine and evaluate current data collection systems used in ports and prepare a reference guide for use of member states in developing or upgrading their national systems.

5. Develop a reference guide of best practices regarding the methods for the exchange of counterdrug intelligence and information applied to port security programs.

6. Develop a guide for the establishment of an interagency council or committee to coordinate the cooperative implementation of counterdrug port security programs.

7. Develop Model Operating Procedures Manual for joint and combined bilateral or regional interdiction operations, for those member states whose laws and regulations allow them to conduct such operations, taking into account the jurisdictional limits and national legal systems of the parties involved when creating the bilateral or regional agreement or arrangements for such operations.

8. Develop a mechanism for agencies in member states to share information with counterparts in other countries regarding concealment methods, trends, routes and general event information related to port security and the control of maritime narcotrafficking.

9. Develop alternatives to increase private industry stakeholder participation in the funding of and involvement in counterdrug port security.

10. Develop a model system or vessel registry to monitor pleasure boats, traditional fishing vessels and “go fast” boats in support of maritime domain awareness and investigations.
11. Develop a reference guide of best practices and procedures for the effective systemic control of chemical cargoes shipped through ports, in order to prevent their illicit diversion.

12. Develop a guide of best practices and procedures to enhance security in free trade zones in ports and free ports to a level comparable to other ports.

13. Examine the feasibility of establishing regional or sub-regional Joint Operations Centers for cooperation among those member states whose laws and regulations allow them to do so.
## Priority Setting for Recomendaciones Marítimas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Priorities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Short Term</td>
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### PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS (shaded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Short Term</th>
<th>Medium Term</th>
<th>Longer Term</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Create a standardized threat/risk assessment matrix for countries to use in evaluating vulnerabilities and gaps in port security, coastal areas, and maritime approaches.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- A matrix concerning ports has been completed. A similar matrix for coastal areas will be drafted and finalized by the Group during a proposed meeting in 2005.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Create a Model Maritime Control Legislation (or a set of laws and regulations) that countries can use to review and update their laws and regulations to ensure adequate maritime jurisdiction and security.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Recommendation made for the Executive Secretariat to compile information concerning legislation and agreements for posting to the CICAD web page. If it is later determined that model legislation is still required then the Group of Experts with technical specialists will undertake this task.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Examine and evaluate current data collection systems used in ports and prepare a reference guide for use of member states in developing or upgrading their national systems.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- To be considered by the Group during its next proposed meeting in 2005 based on the results of the implementation of the ISPS Code.</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Develop a reference guide of best practices regarding the methods for the exchange of counterdrug intelligence and information applied to port security programs.</td>
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<td>- Completed</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td><strong>Develop Model Operating Procedures Manual for joint and combined bilateral or regional interdiction operations, for those member states whose laws and regulations allow them to conduct such operations, taking into account the jurisdictional limits and national legal systems of the parties involved when creating the bilateral or regional agreement or arrangements for such operations.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- A model operating procedures guide was completed. A more detailed manual will be prepared and finalized by the Group during a proposed meeting in 2005</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td><strong>Develop a mechanism for agencies in member states to share information with counterparts in other countries regarding concealment methods, trends, routes and general event information related to port security and the control of maritime narcotrafficking</strong></td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- This recommendation was considered together with recommendation #5 and the action is in process</td>
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<td><strong>OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>Develop best practices and related strategies that member states could implement to promote effective controls over ports and maritime narcotrafficking in an environment of limited resources (human, financial and equipment)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- to be considered at the next meeting of the Group proposed for 2005</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td><strong>Develop a guide for the establishment of an interagency council or committee to coordinate the cooperative implementation of counterdrug port security programs.</strong></td>
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|   | - this issue is to be addressed through the ISPS Code  
- this issue will be re-examined by the Group during the next meeting proposed for 2005 |   |   |   |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Develop alternatives to increase private industry stakeholder participation in the funding of and involvement in counterdrug port security</th>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>- A representative from the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC) will be invited to make a presentation on their work during the next proposed meeting of the Group in 2005.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Develop a model system or vessel registry to monitor pleasure boats, traditional fishing vessels and &quot;go fast&quot; boats in support of maritime domain awareness and investigations</th>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>- The delegation of Colombia will work with the Executive Secretariat to develop a short paper describing the registration system used by Colombia. The Executive Secretariat will post this description and the name of a point of contact for further questions on the CICAD web page. Possible further action on this recommendation will be considered during the next proposed meeting of the Group in 2005.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Develop a reference guide of best practices and procedures for the effective systemic control of chemical cargoes shipped through ports, in order to prevent their illicit diversion.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>- The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). The Code contains detailed security-related requirements for Governments, port authorities and shipping companies in a mandatory section (Part A) for which the deadline for implementation is July 1 2004. The Group will examine the impact of ISPS code implementation during its next meeting along with any additional information that the Executive Secretariat gathers on this issue.</td>
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<th></th>
<th>Develop a guide of best practices and procedures to enhance security in free trade zones in ports and free ports to a level comparable to other ports.</th>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>- See action proposed under recommendation #11 above</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Examine the feasibility of establishing regional or sub-regional Joint Operations Centers for cooperation among those member states whose laws and regulations allow them to do so.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The Executive Secretariat gather information on regional or sub-regional centers of this nature that already exist in the area. The Executive Secretariat will invite a representative from the Kingdom of the Netherlands to deliver a presentation to the Group of Experts during its next proposed meeting in 2005 on their experiences with the center in Curacao.</td>
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PORT – DRUG THREAT/RISK ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST

A. Performance of Port Facility Security Duties
(Circle the appropriate answers)

1) Does the port facility have an existing plan of action for drug enforcement within the facility?
   a) Yes, the port facility has an existing plan of action for drug enforcement
   b) No, the port facility does not have an existing plan of action for drug enforcement

2) Has the port facility established measures to prevent any drugs and other illegal substances and devices from entering the facility?
   a) Yes, measures governing illegal drugs have been established
   b) No, measures governing illegal drugs have not been established

3) Has the port facility established control measures on the movement of chemical precursors within the facility?
   a) Yes, the port facility has established control measures on the movement of chemical precursors
   b) No, the port facility does not have established control measures on the movement of chemical precursors

4) Has the port facility established procedures for response to an activation of a drug smuggling alert system?
   a) Yes, measures governing response procedures have been established
   b) No, measures governing response procedures have not been established

B. Organization of Port Facility Drug Detection Duties

1) Has the port facility established the roles and procedures of the drug enforcement coordinating bodies?
   a) Yes, the roles and procedures have been established
   b) No, the roles and procedures have not been established

2) Has the coordinating bodies responsible for drug detection, enforcement and interdiction established the training requirements for personnel with security roles?
   a) Yes, the training for personnel was established
   b) No, the training requirements for personnel were not established
3) Which of the following agencies participate in counter drug monitoring and interdiction activities in your ports?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private port authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governmental port authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attorney General's office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Police</td>
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<td>National Guard</td>
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<td>Coast Guard</td>
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<td>Navy</td>
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<td>Others (please specify)</td>
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Responsibilities

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<tr>
<th>Coordination</th>
<th>Control of cargos</th>
<th>Control of persons</th>
<th>Information gathering</th>
<th>Interdiction</th>
<th>Monitoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4) Have the port facility drug enforcement coordinating bodies established their individual security organization’s link with other national or local authorities with security responsibilities?
   a) Yes, cooperative links have been established
   b) No, cooperative links have not been established

5) Have the port facility drug enforcement coordinating bodies established communication systems that allow for effective and continuous communication between security personnel, and, when appropriate, national or local authorities with security responsibilities?
   a) Yes, communication systems have been established
   b) No, communication systems have not established

6) Have the port facility drug enforcement coordinating bodies established procedures and practices to protect and ensure the level of security-sensitive information held in paper or electronic format?
   a) Yes, information protection procedures have been established
   b) No, information protection procedures have not been established

7) Have the port facility drug enforcement coordinating bodies established procedures governing submission and assessment of reports relating to possible breaches of security or security concerns?
   a) Yes, submission and assessment procedures have been established
   b) No, submission and assessment procedures have not been established
8) Does the port facility have adequate arrangements for protecting administrative offices including computer equipment – hardware/software, against all types of vessel/shore interface emergencies?
   a) Yes, adequate arrangement to protective offices have been established
   b) No, adequate arrangement to protective offices have not been established

9) Does the port facility have safe and secure back-up office equipment systems to guarantee against loss of data and/or loss resulting from other serious disruptions?
   a) Yes, the port facility has established secure back-up systems
   b) No, the port facility has not established secure back-up systems

10) Does the port facility control the discharge of animal waste, garbage, domestic waste, sanitary waste/sewage, pollutants - oily and noxious liquid substances, etc that might contain illicit drugs on the facility or into adjacent waters?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

11) Does your operation have a Security Education or Drug Enforcement Awareness program (training) to educate and provide employees with regular updates (refreshers) on the importance of drug enforcement issues?
    a) Yes,
    b) No,

12) Does the port facility have written procedures for documenting all drug incidents and ensuring proper maintenance of records pertaining to such incidents/threats – major/minor, which have occurred and affected the port facility in any way in the last ten years?
    a) Yes,
    b) No,

13) Does the port facility conduct a debriefing of all drug incidents and bring the findings to the attention of the staff and facility workers/service providers, etc. in order to prevent against reoccurrence of similar incidents in the future?
    a) Yes,
    b) No,

14) Are telephone numbers for key personnel accurate and routinely validated?
    a) Yes, phone numbers for key personnel are accurate, and routinely validated
    b) Yes, phone numbers for key personnel are accurate, but not routinely validated
    c) No, phone numbers for key personnel were not accurate and validation measures were not were outlined
C. Controlling Access to the Port Facility

1) Have security measures been established for all means of access (including drainages, tunnels, etc.) to the port facility?
   a) Yes, security measures have been established for all access points
   b) No, security measures have not been established for all access points

2) Does the port facility specify the means of identification required to access the port facility?
   a) Yes, specific means of identification are required to access the port facility
   b) No, specific means of identification are not required to access the port facility

3) Does the port facility have the means to differentiate the identification of permanent, temporary, and visiting individuals?
   a) Yes, means of identification differentiation are utilized at the port facility
   b) No, means of identification differentiation are not utilized at the port facility

4) Has the port facility established provisions to ensure that its identification systems are regularly updated?
   a) Yes, procedures have been established for scheduled identification system updates
   b) No, specific procedures have not been established for scheduled identification system updates

5) Has the port facility assigned disciplinary actions for procedural abuse?
   a) Yes, disciplinary actions have been established for procedural abuse
   b) No, disciplinary actions have not been established for procedural abuse

6) Has the port facility created procedures to deny access and report all individuals who are unwilling or unable to establish their identity?
   a) Yes, procedures are utilized to deny access and report the incident to the proper authorities
   b) No, procedures are not utilized to deny access and report the incident to the proper authorities

7) Has the port facility identified an appropriate location(s) for inspection of persons, personal effects, and vehicles?
   a) Yes, an appropriate location(s) has been designated as an inspection area(s)
   b) No, an appropriate location(s) has not been designated as an inspection area(s)
8) Has the port facility established procedures to utilize separate locations for embarking and disembarking passengers, ship’s personnel, and their effects to ensure that unchecked personnel do not come in contact with checked persons?
   a) Yes, measures are employed to separate checked and unchecked persons and their effects
   b) Yes, measures are employed to separate checked and unchecked passengers, but separation measures do not exist for the ship’s crew
   c) No, measures are not employed to separate either checked or unchecked individuals and their effects

9) Has the port facility established the procedures to control shore leave for ship’s personnel?
   a) Yes, personnel management procedures have been established
   b) No, personnel management procedures have not been established

10) Has the port facility established procedures to control visitor access to the ship, to include representatives of seafarers’ welfare and labor organizations?
    a) Yes, ship visitor access procedures have been established
    b) No, ship visitor access procedures have not been established

11) Have unauthorized personnel breached the fencing?
    a) Yes,
    b) No,

    If “Yes”, have records been maintained of past occurrences?
    a) Yes,
    b) No,

12) Has all information on a breach of security been reported to all drug enforcement-coordinating bodies within 24 hours of the incident?
    a) Yes,
    b) No,

13) Do you employ trained drug enforcement personnel to check and control personnel and vehicles at all access points to the port facility?
    a) Yes,
    b) No,

14) Do you maintain a written or electronic record of all visitors, service personnel, vehicles, cargo traffic (inbound/outbound) etc?
    a) Yes,
    b) No,
15) Do the security patrol personnel regularly vary their patrol/surveillance times to avoid establishing routines that can be identified by drug traffickers?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

16) Within the limits of the port facility, is there an active/working railway track in use for hauling inbound/outbound cargoes that is subject to access controls?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

17) Does the port facility have approved equipment to detect and prevent the introduction of illicit drugs and other contraband by vessels' crew, visitors, service providers, vehicle operators, etc.?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

18) Does the port facility have approved equipment (e.g. screening machines, drug detecting canines) and procedures (e.g. risk profiling) to screen passengers and carry-on baggage for drugs when boarding a vessel?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

19) Do you screen your embarking passengers in a secure port facility building?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

20) Once screened, do you keep all passengers in a secure area or if required, do you provide secure, non-stop transportation for passengers and their baggage to the vessel and direct embarkation?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

21) Does your port facility use X-ray equipment (i.e. scanning, gamma) to inspect passengers' and crews' baggage?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

22) Is the X-Ray equipment calibrated according to manufacture's specifications?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

23) Does the port facility maintain and calibrate the foregoing equipment on its own or
   a) Yes,
   b) No,
If “No”, does it seek the services of the equipment manufacturers/authorized service agents?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

24) Are the contractors required to be security cleared?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

25) Are the operators required to be security cleared?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

26) Are the operators trained on the equipment in use?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

27) Is the X-ray equipment kept in a secure area when not in use?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

28) Does your port facility use drug-detecting canine teams to screen baggage for drugs and other illicit substances?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

29) Does your port facility use electronic detection equipment to screen baggage for drugs and other illicit substances?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

30) Are the drug-detecting canines from a certified training school?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

31) Are the dogs’ handlers required to be security cleared?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

32) Is your operation supported by a video surveillance system?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,
33) Is the surveillance system remotely monitored?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

34) Do you have procedures for a lost key/access card recovery plan?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

35) Do you have all combination lock numbers and critically keyed locks changed periodically?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

D. Monitoring of the Port Facility, including Anchoring and Berthing Area(s)

1) Do the port facility drug enforcement coordinating bodies have access to and the capability to continuously monitor on land and water the port facility and its nearby approaches?
   a) Yes, the port facility drug enforcement coordinating bodies have adequate provisions to access and continuously monitor the entire port area
   b) No, the port facility drug enforcement coordinating bodies do not have adequate provisions to access and continuously monitor the entire port area

2) Which of the following resources are employed to monitor the port facility and nearby approaches?
   a) Security guards
   b) Security vehicles
   c) Drug-detecting canines
   d) Radio system
   e) Telephone system
   f) Computer system (E-mail or equivalent messaging capability)
   g) Watercraft
   h) Automatic intrusion-detection devices
   i) Surveillance equipment
   j) Other non-mechanical means
   k) Other mechanical means

3) Are there established procedures, mechanisms and equipment necessary to ensure that monitoring equipment will be able to perform continuously, including the possible effects of weather or power disruptions?
   a) Yes
   b) No
4) Does the port facility have adequate illumination, without shadowed areas, to allow for detection of unauthorized personnel?
   a) Yes
   b) No

5) Are measures established to control the entry, parking, loading, and unloading of vehicles?
   a) Yes, measures have been established to control vehicle access and traffic
   b) No, measures have not been established to control vehicle access and traffic

6) Are measures established to control movement and storage of cargo and ship’s stores?
   a) Yes, measures have been established to control movement and storage of cargo and ship’s stores
   b) No, measures have not been established to control movement and storage of cargo and ship’s stores

7) Are measures established to control unaccompanied baggage or personal effects?
   a) Yes, measures have been established to control unaccompanied baggage or personal effects
   b) No, measures have not been established to control unaccompanied baggage or personal effects

8) Which of the following security measures are utilized to control access to port facilities?
   a) Permanent barriers to surround port facility
   b) Access points controlled by security guards when in use
   c) Access points that can be locked or barred when not in use
   d) Use of passes to indicate a person’s authorization for access
   e) Marking of vehicles that are allowed access
   f) Use of guards and patrols
   g) Use of automatic intrusion-detection devices or surveillance equipment and systems
   h) Control of vessel movement in vicinity of ships using port facility

9) Do you have any waterborne surveillance capability (e.g. CCTV, vessel patrols, etc.) or other means of preventing access to your port facility?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

10) Do you have on staff, or a procedure in place to obtain, certified/qualified divers to conduct underwater surveys of vessels or dock facilities?
    a) Yes,
    b) No,
11) Do you have any underwater monitoring equipment to monitor and inspect the port facility, approaches, anchorages and vessels?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

12) Do you have or can you make use of a boat or vessel to prevent and/or control access to the port facility from seaward?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

13) Is the water adjacent to the port facility adequately illuminated during silent hours and/or in poor weather conditions?
   a) Yes,
   b) No,

14) Is the water adjacent to the port facility routinely patrolled by a law enforcement agency?
   a) Yes
   b) No

15) Does the local law enforcement agency have a capability to conduct water patrols adjacent to your port facility?
   a) Yes
   b) No

16) Does the port facility control access to and from the vessel at anchorage?
   a) Yes
   b) No

E. Supervising the Handling of Cargo

1) Are measures employed to routinely monitor and control the integrity of cargo and inventory stored in the port facility?
   a) Yes, technology is employed to monitor and control the cargo and inventory storage area
   b) No, technology is not employed to monitor and control the cargo and inventory storage area

2) Which of the following means are employed to conduct cargo inspection?
   a) Visual inspection
   b) Physical inspection
   c) Scanning or detection equipment
   d) Drug detecting canine
   e) Other mechanical means
3) Do you receive cargo manifests 24 hours before arrival/loading and use it for drug risk profiling before authorizing access of the cargo to the port facility?
   a) Yes, documentation is received and cross-referenced, allowing only cargo due for export or import into the facility
   b) Yes, documentation is received but not cross-referenced before allowing cargo due for export or import into the facility
   c) No, documentation is not received and cross-referenced, allowing only cargo due for export or import into the facility

4) Are ship’s stores inspected to ensure package integrity?
   a) Yes, personnel perform visual or physical inspections of all ship’s stores to ensure seals and packages were intact
   b) Yes, personnel perform random visual or physical inspections of ship’s stores to ensure seals and packages were intact
   c) No, personnel do not inspect ship’s stores for package integrity

5) Are procedures followed to ensure that, based upon a risk profile system, ship’s stores will be inspected?
   a) Yes, ship’s stores inspection procedures are followed
   b) No, ship’s stores inspection procedures are not followed

6) Which of the following means are employed to inspect ship’s stores?
   a) Visual inspection
   b) Physical inspection
   c) Scanning or detection equipment
   d) Other mechanical means
   e) Drug detecting canine teams

7) Are ship’s stores deliveries controlled with a corresponding manifest and order documentation?
   a) Yes, deliveries are validated with a manifest and order documentation
   b) No, deliveries are not validated with a manifest or order documentation

8) Does the port facility have transit/long-term storage facilities near the berth (pier)?
   a) Yes
   b) No
### DRUG – PORT THREAT/RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gap Scenario</th>
<th>Threat intelligence</th>
<th>History</th>
<th>Feasibility</th>
<th>Existing Security</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Control Effectiveness Personnel</th>
<th>Means of Control</th>
<th>Impact Human Loss</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Total Risk Score</th>
<th>Mitigation Action</th>
<th>Agency Responsible</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# SCORING DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS

## THREAT ASSESSMENT SCORING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Intelligence Assessment</th>
<th>History</th>
<th>Feasibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 9 (Imminent) | Multiple sources confirm:  
• Target  
• Intent  
• Parties involved  
Events have occurred that serve as a catalyst | Scenario has occurred frequently in the past | High probability of success  
Difficult to detect |
| 6 (High) | Multiple sources confirm:  
• Target  
• Intent  
• Parties involved  
Scenario has occurred infrequently in the past. | Moderate probability of success  
Limited ability to detect |
| 3 (Medium) | Limited sources suggesting:  
• Target  
• Intent  
• Parties involved  
Scenario has been considered, but not yet occurred | Limited probability of success  
Moderate ability to detect |
| 0 (Low) | No reporting suggesting consideration or intent of scenario | No indication that this particular scenario has ever been considered | Low probability of success  
Easily detectable |

## VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT SCORING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Existing Security</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Control Effectiveness</th>
<th>Control Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited or no security measures to limit access</td>
<td>Cargo/Container storage area</td>
<td>Vessel crews</td>
<td>Low level of control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 9 (Extreme) | Some security measure in place to limit access, but not maintained or supported by policies / procedures | Anchorage and berthing areas  
Docks/Piers | Outside contractors  
Suppliers  
Port facility workers | Limited level of control |
| 6 (High) | Security measures in place to limit access | Access points  
Passenger terminals | Vessel passengers  
Port facility workers | Moderate level of control |
| 3 (Medium) | Extensive and robust security measures in place | Restricted areas in the port facility | Security cleared personnel | High level of control |
| 0 (Low) |                                    |                                      |                                      |                                      |
## IMPACT ASSESSMENT SCORING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Human Losses</th>
<th>Economic Consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Extensive loss of life and injury</td>
<td>Significant short and long term consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Extreme)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Moderate loss of life and/or injury</td>
<td>Moderate short and long term economic impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(High)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Minor loss of life and/or injury</td>
<td>Some short term economic impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Medium)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No loss of life or injury</td>
<td>Minimal short term economic consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Low)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SAMPLE #1

#### 1. IDENTIFICATION OF GAP (Name & Number)
- Lack of monitoring of the port facility, including anchoring and berthing area(s) (D#1)

#### 2. DESCRIPTION OF ASSOCIATED SCENARIO (Reasonable, detailed description)
Drug traffickers, using small inconspicuous vessels, take advantage of the blind side of a boat to download drugs:
- Blind side of boat is blocked from camera surveillance
- Small vessels operate from un-patrolled and isolated beach areas
- Lack of monitoring and patrols on blind side of boats that are approaching or

#### 3. THREAT EVALUATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Score (0,3,6,9)</th>
<th>Rational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Assessment</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Multiple sources confirm:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Parties involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Events have occurred that serve as a catalyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Similar Incidents</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Scenario has occurred frequently in the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>High probability of success and difficult to detect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Score (0,3,6,9)</th>
<th>Rational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existing Security</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Some security measure in place to limit access, but not maintained or supported by policies/procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Anchorage and berthing areas; Docks/Piers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Vessel crews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means of Control</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Limited level of control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 5. IMPACT ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Score (0,3,6,9)</th>
<th>Rational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Loss</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No loss of life or injury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Consequence</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Moderate short and long term economic impact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 6. RISK ASSESSMENT

| Total Risk Score         | 54              |

#### 7. Mitigation Action
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. Agency(s) Responsible</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. Comments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## COMPLETED RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

### SAMPLE #2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. IDENTIFICATION OF GAP (Name &amp; Number)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of monitoring of the container loading areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. DESCRIPTION OF ASSOCIATED SCENARIO (Reasonable, detailed description)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drugs are taken out of or put into containers:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 20 hours before lading</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. THREAT EVALUATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factor</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Similar Incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factor</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Effectiveness</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means of Control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. IMPACT ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factor</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Consequence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. RISK ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Risk Score</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. Mitigation Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. Agency(s) Responsible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
REFERENCE GUIDE FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON MARITIME TRAFFIC.

THIS GUIDE HAS BEEN COMPILED AS A REFERENCE DOCUMENT FOR THE MEMBER STATES FOR INFORMATION EXCHANGE, AS A TECHNICAL/MANAGEMENT TOOL TO ENABLE THEM TO READILY ACCESS OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INFORMATION CONCERNING MARITIME DRUG TRAFFICKING.

THE MATRIX:

- IS A REFERENCE TOOL THAT OFFERS A GUIDE TO THE TYPE OF DATA THAT IS USEFUL FOR EXCHANGE AMONG THE MEMBER STATES.

- THIS EXCHANGE CAN OCCUR WITHIN MEMBER STATES, AMONG NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES INVOLVED IN MARITIME DRUG INTERDICTION, AND/OR AMONG MEMBER STATES OF CICAD.

- THE MATRIX GUIDE IS PROVIDED TO THE MEMBER STATES TO BE USED AS REQUIRED ACCORDING TO THEIR OPERATIONAL NEEDS TO PROMOTE THE EXCHANGE.

INFORMATION REPORT NO.__________   FROM OPERATIONAL RESPONSE_________

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>INFORMATION ON THE VESSEL.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Type of vessel (container, bulk, fishing, non-commercial, sport, speedboat, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Vessel identification: registry, flag, shipping line, number, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Description of the vessel: length, displacement, color of hull and superstructure, alterations, propulsion, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Background on the vessel: involvement or not in illicit trafficking and/or suspicious activity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY THAT MADE THE SEIZURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Country and agencies involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Facts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Detection measures used</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATA ON THE SEIZURE.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Type of seizure, in case of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, chemical precursors, fuel, markings, logos, labels, packing, protection, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Quantity and value of the seizure.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Method of concealment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Date and time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Place of the seizure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Origin of the source.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CREW.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Crew manifest with general data, nationality, occupation, name, age, number, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Status of the crew involved in the case.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **ORIGIN** |  |
| **CARGO DESCRIPTION.** |  |
| - Type of cargo. |  |
| - For container cargo, origin of the container, route, customs agency involved. |  |
| - Container data, such as number on seals, number on container, container line, etc. |  |

| **COUNTRY OF ORIGIN.** |  |
| - Country |  |
| - Port of embarkation |  |
| - Waybill number, with cargo manifest showing date of sailing. |  |
| - Final destination. |  |

| **TRANSIT** |  |
| **ROUTE.** |  |
| - Transit countries (lading ports and others), emphasizing last port. |  |
| - Cargo movement (bulk, containers, tankers, pallets or others) |  |
| - Duration of the voyage, in case of speedboats, possible refueling locations. |  |

| **DESTINATION** |  |
| - Final destination. |  |
| - Ports for unloading. |  |
| - ETA. |  |

| **INFORMATION ON CONSIGNEES AT ORIGIN AND DESTINATION.** |  |
| - Cargo manifest. |  |
| - Background of the consignee. |  |

| **OTHER OBSERVATIONS** |  |
I. Drug Information Centers System (DIC)

The Drug Information Centers are real-time hubs for the exchange of anti-drug information, international or inter-agency coordination, and presentation of reports in the region served by the Center. The four Drug Information Centers established in the Americas are pilot centers for the eventual establishment of Centers in Europe, southwest Asia, and eastern Asia.

The DIC system is a program organized by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) through which four Drug Information Centers have been set up in the hemisphere. The Centers in Mexico, Colombia, Santo Domingo, and Bolivia are currently in operation.

These centers gather data on drug trafficking produced in the countries in the respective region, evaluate and process it, and disseminate it to those who should have it. In addition, they engender operational coordination among the countries because it is a permanently operating system.

The databases of all the participating countries are available to other members for the exchange of information, limited by any applicable legal restrictions.

The program uses a website that makes it possible to deliver information to a center and to request general or specific information from any of the participating agencies.

Each of the centers reports developments during the past 24 hours in its region, and news posted by the other centers. This enables each participating agency to have daily access to a global panorama of events in the hemisphere, the type of drug seized, methods of transportation and concealment, routes, etc. This is a valuable working tool for local analysis by each agency.

1. Mission and objective

   Mission

   The Drug Information Centers’ mission is to provide support for the interdiction of illicit drug traffic, through the exchange of operational and tactical information among judicial and enforcement authorities. The exchange of drug information among the participating countries and institutions will improve the authorities’ efficiency and effectiveness in enforcement of anti-drug laws.
Objective

The main work of the Drug Information Centers is exchange of operational and tactical information to support law enforcement authorities. Successful execution of the work will achieve:

Better multilateral and multinational coordination.

- Strengthened law enforcement efforts in and among the regions.
- Enhanced capabilities of the participating countries and institutions.

Opportune and effective exchange of data on investigations.

- Development of a comprehensive procedure for exchange of information.
- Timely and secure exchange of information on investigations.
- Communications linkage in and among the regions.

Exchange of ideas and experiences of the participating countries and institutions.

2.- GOALS

a. Strengthen the concept that drug trafficking is a global problem demanding world-wide attention of judicial and police authorities. Encourage and actively promote strong anti-drug societies in the participating countries.

b. Develop a strategy to combat illicit drug trafficking in the region. Study and review the threats posed by illicit drug trafficking, as a basis for a short- and long-term strategy. This includes development of a list of targeted traffickers and joint planning to apprehend them and seize their drugs, inputs, and assets.

c. Start and support development of regional investigations and operations.

d. Respond to each member country’s anti-drug priorities, as well as the regional priorities for law enforcement identified by the participating countries.

e. Promote the development of operational and tactical information for immediate use in investigations and operations against illicit drug trafficking.
f. Promote the exchange of other transnational information on law enforcement, including trafficking in persons and weapons, visa fraud, money laundering, terrorism, and other areas of mutual concern.

3.- PHASES

Drug Information Centers will be established in three phases:

a.- PHASE I.

Establish Pilot Centers
- Four Western Hemisphere countries
- Initial operations
- Test of the concept

b.- PHASE II

Full operations in the Western Hemisphere
Start planning for the other Regional Centers

c.- PHASE III

Establish the other Regional Centers
- Europe
- Southwest Asia
- East Asia
4.- PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES

The countries indicated below participate in the four existing Drug Information Centers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bogotá</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Santa Cruz</th>
<th>Santo Domingo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Anguilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Antigua</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Aruba</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Martinique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bonaire</td>
<td>St. Martin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td></td>
<td>Curacao</td>
<td>St. Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td></td>
<td>Suriname</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td></td>
<td>Virgin Islands - USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II.- GUIDE FOR JOINING THE SYSTEM.

It has been learned through unofficial sources that most of the member states already have access to the Drug Information Centers, which facilitates the entry process. The following steps are suggested for identifying and, where appropriate, promoting the entry of the systems of each member state’s agencies responsible for fighting drug trafficking.

1.- The DEA reportedly has liaison offices in most of the U.S. embassies or diplomatic missions in the hemisphere and has a terminal of the system linked to the Drug Information Centers already established (Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, and Dominican Republic), so that data gleaned in the participating countries is validated, classified, processed, and disseminated to the same countries for their use, thus closing the circle so that all participate in the joint effort.

2.- Once the terminal is identified, the next step is to decide which (national/local) agency of the state will have access to the data from the system. Generally they will be the courts, attorneys general, public prosecutors, customs, police, armed forces (defense, navy, coast guard, and/or air force), joint chiefs of staff, and in some cases, defense ministries.

3.- If the State lacks this access, it is suggested that overtures be made through diplomatic channels so that the DEA representative in the U.S. Embassy promotes the exchange of information and installation of a system terminal in the agency charged with combating maritime drug trafficking.

It is recommended that States that already have the system channel the information to local authorities tasked with combating maritime drug trafficking.

Similarly, those States that already have bilateral or multilateral agreements with other States on exchange of information on drug trafficking should encourage participation of authorities responsible for combating it in order to mount a common hemispheric front to this scourge.
MODEL OPERATING PROCEDURES GUIDE FOR COMBINED MARITIME COUNTER DRUG OPERATIONS

PREAMBLE
During CICAD’s XXXIV REGULAR SESSION (November 2003) a Working Group of Experts from ten (10) CICAD member States presented the results of a study on maritime narcotrafficking in the hemisphere. The Commission accepted the report and recommendations and, among other tasks, directed that Group of Experts develop a Model Guide for Maritime Operating Procedures.

PURPOSE
Some CICAD member states have entered into bilateral, multilateral or regional cooperation agreements for operational activities to counter maritime narcotrafficking. These member states have the national laws and regulations that allow them to conduct such operations, taking into account the jurisdictional limits and national legal systems of the states involved when planning for such operations.

To save time and expedite the planning and organizational phases of such joint operations, it is useful to have predefined operational procedures that can be activated by the participating countries when suspect vessels or aircraft are identified. The nature of these procedures are defined by the terms and conditions of the agreement between the participating countries.

This Model Guide provides a framework for establishing procedures that will be implemented during joint and combined bilateral/multilateral counterdrug operations. The Model Guide identifies various elements that should be included in such procedures and some of the issues that the procedures need to address.

JURISDICTION
Member States are encouraged to stipulate all International Conventions, Treaties, Bilateral /Multilateral Agreements and National Legislation when applicable before conducting combine counterdrug operations. All States are required to observe the sovereignty while operating within a member state’s jurisdictional waters.

I. SITUATIONS FOR CONDUCTING COMBINED OPERATIONS

PLANNED OPERATIONS
Some countries make use of a predefined plan of action to conduct operational activities within specific parameters such as geographical area, time period, frequency or potential targets or suspects. These operational activities may include conducting intelligence or monitoring patrols, taking enforcement actions, enforcing
international conventions, or enforcing bilateral/multilateral agreements with respect to counterdrug situations. These are considered to be **planned operations**.

**UNPLANNED OPERATIONS**

Unplanned operations may be conducted in response to immediate, unanticipated counterdrug situations within the limits of each country’s capability and jurisdiction. Operations of this nature may include detection, monitoring and interdiction of vessels or aircraft.

**II. COOPERATIVE PROCEDURES**

**PURPOSE**

The purpose of these procedures is to facilitate the planning of cooperative counterdrug operations, and to coordinate an effective response to situations of an unplanned nature, such as the detection of targets of mutual interest and violation of law as stipulated under International Conventions, Treaties, Bilateral /Multilateral Agreements and National Legislation.

**TRAINING AND EXERCISES**

States are encouraged to engage in training and exercises in order to ensure preparedness for operations and to improve procedures.

**LOGISTICAL / TECHNICAL SUPPORT**

Arrangements should be made to facilitate support to participating States by the host State during combined counterdrug operations.

**DESIGNATION OF ON-SCENE COMMANDER**

The On-Scene Commander/Coordinator is the person designated by the parties involved to direct the activities of the joint, bilateral or multilateral operation. This individual may be physically situated at or near the site of the operational activities in question or possibly more farther removed from that location depending on the circumstances. The responsibilities of this individual should be limited to coordination purposes related to the operation in question and have no sovereignty implications.

The member states should define in advance the procedures to be used in designating the On-Scene Commander/Coordinator. These procedures should require the designation of this person as early in the operation as possible and all parties should be made aware of the designation.
**ACTION PLAN**
Member states participating in combined operations should clearly define the Action Plan they are to follow. They should do so, taking into consideration all resources that are available for the operation in question. An action plan may include:

- an operations order when applicable
- joint review of intelligence/information
- aircraft coordination
- personnel exchange
- reporting requirements
- rendezvous times
- command & control

**USE OF FORCE / RULES OF ENGAGEMENT**
States need to be aware of their legislation and policies governing Rules of Engagement, and the legislation and policies of all other States involved in the operation. Prior to commencing an operation, all States need to agree on the Use of Force and Rules of Engagement and these should be reflected in the operational procedures that are established.

Provisions for the use of force in the operational procedures should be sufficiently comprehensive and detailed such that it is very clear when and under what circumstances force may be used, the nature of such force, responsibilities for decisions related to the use of force and should address all other relevant issues related to the use of force. Participating States need to be fully aware of their responsibilities, as well as those of all States involved in the operation.

**BOARDING POLICY**
States need to be aware of National Legislation, Policies and Bilateral/Multilateral Agreements governing this action.

Prior to commencing an operation, States need to agree on when and how a boarding will take place.

**HOT PURSUIT**
States need to be aware of National Legislation and Policies, as well as with International Law or Bilateral/Multilateral Agreements governing this action.

**LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTION**

a) **Action Request**
States need to make a formal request for cooperation and law enforcement action from another State. The type of action being requested needs to be clearly stated and agreed by all involved States prior to commencing any action.
b) **Briefing: Intelligence / Information**
Requesting States should share all pertinent information concerning a proposed operation. A line of communication needs to be established to ensure the immediate flow of information between all involved States. Important details may include (see Reference Guide on Exchange of Information).

- vessel name
- vessel type
- nationality
- vessel position
- suspected activity
- type of drug / quantity (known or suspected)
- number of people on board
- known / suspected weapons

c) **Objective of Operation**
States need to have concise and clear objectives and articulate them to all involved. States need to establish exactly how the objectives will be accomplished, and include this information in the Operational Plan (see below).

d) **Operational Plan**
A plan of operations needs to be developed in consultation with all involved States, and if possible an Operations Order published and distributed. The Operational Plan is a detailed written plan that identifies the objective(s) of the operation, and how the objective(s) will be met. The Operational Plan will include the roles and responsibilities of all parties.

e) **Evidence Gathering / Evidence Seizure / Evidence Handling**
States need to be cognizant of legal requirements / procedures of their State and of other States involved in the operation.

Prior to commencing an operation, all involved States need to agree upon the following, (should be included in the operational plan):

- what evidence is being sought
- who will seize the evidence
- how evidence will be handled and stored
- where it will be stored
- how evidence will be inventoried
- if evidence can be turned over to another jurisdiction
- other issues

f) **Arrest / Prosecution**
States need to be aware of their authority to arrest and prosecute. These authorities may be found in National legislation, bilateral/multi-lateral agreements, or international law.
Prior to commencing and operation with another State, all parties need to come to an agreement specifying:

- who will be responsible for making arrests
- who will secure prisoners
- where prisoners will be secured
- who will prosecute

**g) Liaison Officers**
When possible, States should identify liaison officers to be on-sight during an operation to assist with ensuring the proper flow of intelligence and information.

**h) Report of Actions taken**
Detailed reports of any enforcement actions taken should be completed in as much detail as possible, and provided to other States involved in the operation.

Prior to commencing an operation, States need to agree upon a reporting procedure, which may include:

- who is responsible for completing the report
- what format should the report take
- what details need to be covered in the report
- who will receive the report

**COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES**
States are encouraged to establish National communications protocols, addressing:

- establish protocols at a national level
- communication security
- operational security
- comparable methods of communications
- establishing agreed codes/geographical points

It is encouraged for vessels operating in a country’s adjacent jurisdictional waters to test communications links and procedures.

**DEBRIEFING**
States are encouraged to conduct full debriefings after each operation to assess:

- actions taken
- information / intelligence sharing
- logistical issues
- legal issues
- others

A report should be generated from these debriefings, and shared with all parties involved in the operation. Recommendations on how to improve operations should be implemented.
ANNEX

1. GLOSSARY OF TERMS
   • A list of terms that will bring clarity to member States participating in a combined operation that may have misunderstanding. Examples:

   **Controlled Delivery**
   The technique allowing illicit or suspect consignments of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, precursor chemicals or substances substituted for them, to pass out of, through or into the territory of one or more countries, with the knowledge and under supervision of their competent authorities, with a view to identifying persons involved in the commission of offences (Article 1(g), 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances)

   **Hot Pursuit**
   The action undertaken against a foreign ship by a coastal State with good reason to believe that the ship has violated its laws and regulations. It can only be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing State. It may only be continued beyond the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted (Article 11, United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea). The pursuit into the territorial waters of another State may continue only if approved by treaty, convention or by agreement of the State.

2. CONVENTIONS/TREATIES/AGREEMENTS
   • Copies of all pertinent Conventions and all Treaties/Agreements that the participating member States are signatory to should be included in this Annex.

3. COMMUNICATION PLAN
   • frequencies
   • codes/encryption
   • bench marks/geographical references call signs
   • secondary communications

4. SAMPLE OPERATIONAL PLAN
   • A sample of an Operational Plan should be included to act as a reference.

5. DIRECTORY OF POINT OF CONTACT (COMPETENT NATIONAL AUTHORITY)
   • The complied directory should be attached.

6. BEST PRACTICES
   • A section containing a list of best practices / lessons learned should be attached.